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Abstract: An economic model is introduced to discuss the impacts of rural migration on 
skills in source and destination localities and regions. Two versions of the model are used 
without and with risks. In this context, the model considers that rural migration is 
determined by the demand for education and urban rural wage differences. The optimal 
decision rules attained are tested against available aggregate data for series of developing 
countries. The preliminary empirical results show the existence of country variations of 
rural emigration with varied impacts on education with likely losses in localities of 
emigration. Economic and social policies are to account for these impacts mainly when 
emphasis is placed on regional and local development programs.  
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Introduction 
 
Skilled labor is known to be mobile, as it tends to move form locations with lower 
opportunities to those with higher outcomes and better operating and living conditions.  
This applies for both internal and cross-border migrations as those skilled workers move 
from poorer to richer areas, from rural to urban locations, and also to other countries that 
offer better opportunities. These movements while ensuring better conditions to the 
skilled labor emigrant and to the destination areas, may contribute to lowering the human 
capital availability for the localities of origin implying that human capital loss can occur 
at the levels of places that are source of emigration. It is expected that rural areas in 
developing countries be those locations that are the most affected by any likely loss of 
skilled labor and thus human capital. But, as recognized by the new economics of brain 
drain, the local educational systems of the locations of origin may exhibit some gains that 
can compensate for the direct loss of skills. The new economics of skilled labor 
emigration has been providing new evidence to support the existence of human capital 
gains not only in the destination but also in the sources of emigration. Yet, there has been 
no final position with regard to the magnitude of the potential gains and losses achieved 
by the countries and locations source of emigration because remittances and skills may 
not be complements (G. Ranis, 2007). Also lower gains have been observed when 
accounting for risk aversion (Driouchi et al, 2009; M. Schiff, 2005). 
The major issue raised in this paper is related to the existence or absence of human 
capital gains and losses in localities sources of skilled labor mobility and emigration.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether or not the human capital gains in the 
localities of origin can be similar to those related to cross-border migration. Can one 
expect that poorer localities be likely to enhance their educational systems in order to 
cope with the emigration of their skilled labor, or does skilled labor mobility only 
generates further poverty as skills are progressively drained from the source localities?  
 
The above purpose is achieved through looking at rural emigration at the level of any 
given developing country. Three sections are respectively introduced in this paper. The 
first one is a literature review on the matter. The second is the theoretical model 
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suggested to capture the processes under study. The last section focuses on some 
preliminary empirical findings related to the implementation of the theoretical model.   
 
I. Literature Review 
 
Some authors have developed models and assessments of human capital gains and losses 
over different economies accounting for skilled labor migration (M. Beine et al, 2001, 
2003, 2006; F. Docquier and H. Rapoport, 2003, 2005, 2007; F. Docquier, O. Lohest and 
A. Marfouk, 2005, 2007; F. Docquier and K. Sekkat, 2006; F. Docquier, B. Lindsay Lowell 
and A. Marfouk, 2007). Most of these authors have recognized the likely positive impacts 
of skilled labor emigration on the source countries.  
Important results have been attained within the new economics of skilled labor migration. 
Besides showing the existence of brain gains, the findings include also the factors that 
affect migration and the magnitude of human capital gains and losses. Given the 
multiplicity of factors that have an impact on human capital gains and losses in the 
countries source of skilled labor migration, domestic, regional and international policies 
have benefited from further investigations and more practical evidences (F. Docquier and 
K. Sekkat, 2006). In this process series of contributions are still developing (Peter 
Schaeffer, 2005; B. C. Chakraborty, 2006 and Hung-Ju Chen, 2006). So far, the above-
mentioned studies have dealt with skilled labor mobility from developing to developed 
countries.  
 
Others however have focused on skilled labor mobility within the same country namely, 
rural-urban migration. In this case, the generalization of brain gains and human capital 
formation improvements to the case of rural-urban migration remains a source of 
controversy in the related literature. For instance, Stark & Fan (2007) have used a model 
that links three key factors: the process of migration from the rural area to the urban area, 
the externality effect of the average level of human capital, and agglomeration economy. 
The research implies that in case of free movement of labor, all skilled workers will 
cluster in the urban area, leaving the rural area with an average level of human capital 
that is below the social optimum. The authors emphasize that unrestricted rural-to urban 
migration reduces the average income of both rural and urban residents in equilibrium. 
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They explain that as skilled workers are likely to concentrate in the cities, the wage rate 
of the unskilled workers in the rural areas will be low, which in turn will induce a large 
number of unskilled rural workers to leave for the cities. With free labor mobility, urban 
wage will decline continuously with the in-migration of unskilled workers which, in turn, 
will reduce the average level of human capital in the city. Along with this idea, Lucas 
 (2001) states that larger expenditures on education result in a lower level of human 
capital in the city and the same level of human capital in the countryside, which will  
reduce the economic prosperity of the entire economy. Thus with respect to unrestricted 
rural-urban migration, in a developing country where unskilled workers far outnumber 
skilled workers, increasing the human capital stock through education will not by itself 
reverse the inefficient allocation of the average human capital between the rural and 
urban areas.  
 
Other empirical findings suggest a positive impact of rural migration on human capital 
formation in the localities of origin. The new economics of labor migration approach 
established that migrants’ remittances impacts are conceived in term of risk management, 
income diversification and alleviation of liquidity constraints at household level in the 
locality of origin (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1991). In parallel, the question of 
whether or not such alleviation of liquidity constraints results in investment in productive 
or merely consumption activities was largely explored. In a study by De Brauw et al. 
(2003), evidence was provided that the remittances sent by rural migrants partially 
compensate for the lost-labor effect, contributing to household incomes directly and also 
indirectly by stimulating crop production. Likewise, Rozelle et al. (1999) have shown the 
growth potential of migration in rural China whereby remittances accumulated 
compensate for labor loss and allow households to improve their agricultural 
productivity. In this sense, rural households benefiting from remittances tend to call upon 
external labor for agricultural activities to replace the absence of household members. 
This does not only imply job creation but more importantly the preservation and 
perpetuation of skills and local know-how in agriculture. Moreover, the local skills might 
even improve as new technologies and new crops are introduced in relation to the risk 
diversification and effects of remittances.  
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Also, a recent study on Guatemala, for example, Adams (2005) finds that households 
receiving remittances actually spend less at the margin on consumption and tend to spend 
a larger amount of remittance on investment goods, in particular education and housing. 
Furthermore, expenditure on house construction through remittances can stimulate local 
construction enterprises, growing demands for services and boosting labor demand. 
Overall, there are important indirect effects that spread from migrants to non-migrant 
households within the locality of origin. Expenditure and income linkages at the village-
level in sending regions create a ‘remittance multipliers’ on local incomes, labor and 
employment. Migration may also influence rural production and expenditures by altering 
the prices of local goods and production factors and migrants may encourage investments 
in their area of origin by others through demand-side spillovers (Lucas 2005). In general, 
Taylor and Martin (2001) suggest that migration is likely to have the largest positive 
effect on rural source economies when the losses of human and other capital are small. 
The authors suggest also that these these positive effects take place when the benefits of 
migration accrue disproportionately to households that face the greatest initial constraints 
to local production and when households that receive remittances have expenditure 
patterns that produce the largest rural income multipliers. 
All these, definitely point to a potential increase in the human capital in localities of 
origin; be it through the increase in education expenditures, or through the emergence of 
new skills related to the reshaping of the local economy fostered by remittances.  
 
 
II. Theoretical Model 
 
The suggested theoretical economic model considers that candidate migrants move from 
location A (say rural) to location B (urban) with decisions based on the needs for 
education and for extra-income. These are assumed to be provided at higher levels in the 
destination region.  
In this context, the variable ω  measures labor productivity and is assumed to be 
equivalent to the wages prevailing in a given economy. This variable takes two values as 
in Stark et al., (2005) that are  ωr  and ωu  for rural and urban sectors respectively. 
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Individuals are assumed to migrate from rural to urban areas if (ω ω>u r ). In practice this 
is often the case but decisions of migrating or staying are related to the probability m  
and  (1 )m−  respectively. Furthermore, decision makers are supposed to seek education 
level s  at the cost ( ) .=C s c s , 0>c  (Patrinos et al., 2006) with related benefits from 
education represented by ( ) . γ=g s a s  with0 1γ< < , '( ) 0>g s , "( ) 0<g s  and where 
‘a ’defines the basic talent of the individual. Decisions consist in maximizing  ( )V s  that 
accounts for the expected net benefits that are based on ensuring with probability m and 
(1-m) the benefits from rural migration where ( ( )g s ) and ( ( )C s ) are as defined 
previously. 
 
In case of risk neutrality, the decision is based on selecting s  to maximize  . ( )ω g s  based 
on m  and ( )1−m  besides the costs of education. This is given by:  
 
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )ω ω= + − −u rV s m g s m g s cs                                                                             
( ) (1 )γ γω ω= + − −u rV s m as m as cs   
 
Given the conditions imposed on the parameter,γ the necessary and sufficient condition 
for a maximum is given by:  
( )' 1( ) 0γγ ω ω ω−  = − + − = u r rV s a s m c                                                                         (1) 
The optimal level of education is then given by: 
[ ]
1
1
*
( )
γ
γ ω ω ω
− 
=  
− +  u r r
c
s
a m
                                                                                         (2) 
                                            
 
Internal migration with probabilitym  leads to the optimal level of education (
*s ) as 
given by (2). 
 
In case of staying in the rural area ( 0=m ), the optimal level of education is given by: 
1
1
*
0
γ
γω
− 
=  
 r
c
s
a
                                                                                                                  (3) 
 
This implies that emigrants (1>m>0) achieve higher levels of education as shown by:  
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[ ]
1
* 1
*
0
( )
1
γω ω ω
ω
− − +
= > 
 
u r r
r
ms
s
                                                                                      (4) 
 
Proposition 1:  
The optimal level of education of an individual who decides to emigrate is higher than 
that of an individual who decides to remain in his area of origin (say rural area) ( * *0>s s ).  
 
Individual labor supply in the presence of rural emigration: 
The individual labor supply corresponding to this emigration is obtained by replacing 
*s in ( )g s  as in equation (5): 
 
 
                                                             
For the individual who chooses to remain in the rural area of origin, the individual labor 
supply is given by equation (6):  
( )
1
1
* 1
0
γ
γ
γ
γω
−
−  = =  
 
r
r
c
l g s a
                                                      
Based on the above, it can be noted that :  
• 0<u
dl
dc
 and 0
( )ω ω
>
−
u
u r
dl
d
 
• When 0=m , 
1
0
.
γ
γ
γ ω
−
=
 
= = 
 
u r
m r
c
l a l
a
                                                                             
   
Proposition 2: 
ul  is an individual function of the labor supply. This supply decreases (increases) when 
the cost of education increases (decreases) and increases (decreases) when the difference 
between urban and rural salaries increases (decreases). In the absence of migration, the 
labor supply is equal to that prevailing in the rural area. 
( ) [ ]
1
*
.
( )
u
u r r
c
l g s a
a m
γ
γ
γ ω ω ω
− 
= =  
− +  
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Aggregated labor supply in the presence of rural emigration 
With emigration at probability m, the total labor supply in the urban area with Nu and Nm 
respectively representing the initial population and the emigrants with Nm=m.Nr and Nr 
being the rural labor force, is given by: 
( ) ( )
[ ]
1 1
1. . .
( )
u u u m u u r
u r r
c
L N l N N l N mN a
m
γ
γ
γ
γ ω ω ω
−
−
 
= = + = +  
− +                              
(7) 
Given formulation (7), the aggregated labor supply in the absence of emigration ( 0=m ) 
is given by  (8): 
0
1
1
1. .
γ
γ
γ
γω
−
−  = =  
 
u u u u
r
c
L N l N a
                                                                                                  
The optimal value uL  (equation 9) is related to the emigrants. For those who choose to 
stay, the aggregated labor supply is given by: 
(1 )= −r r rL m N l                       
1
1
1(1 ) .
γ
γ
γ
γω
−
−  = −  
 
r r
r
c
L m N a                                                                                          (9) 
Equation (9) reflects the labor supply in the rural area in case of migration. 
Based on the sensitivity of the results (see Appendix I), the maximum value of the 
migration rate arises when the second derivative of the labor supply in the urban area is 
negative:     
( )* 1
( )
γ ω
γ
ω ω
−
= −
−
r u
u r r
N
m
N
. 
Yet, this optimal migration value is not part of the definition interval of the migration rate 
( [ ]0,1∈m ) as it is negative. 
The first derivative of the total labor supply in the urban area (see Appendix I) is always 
positive when [ ]0,1∈m , which implies that the labor supply in the urban area increases 
with the increase of the migration rate.  
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Implicit biases, imperfections, and risks: 
Risks related to agriculture and biases against agriculture (K.Anderson and J.L Croser, 
2010; K.Anderson, 2010) supposedly affect the level of salaries in the rural areas, the 
latter decreases to level *ωr , and hence the value ωr becomes lower than the initial value. 
The sharp decrease in salaries and hence in revenue is expressed through the variable 
0 1< <t  such as :  
* (1 )ω ω= −r rt  
Also, urban salaries or revenue are supposedly represented by minimum guaranteed level
 
*ωu   such as 
*ωu is related to the initial wage with a coefficient α with 0 1α< <  and: 
* (1 )ω α ω= +u u   
 
Optimal level of education 
In order to obtain the rural optimal level of education induced by rural migration, the 
implicit biases and risks related to agriculture ( )BV s should be maximized: 
( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )γ γα ω ω= + + − − −B u B r B BV s m as m t as cs     
The necessary and sufficient condition for a maximum V  is given by: 
                                                              
( ) ( ) ( ){ }' 1( ) 1 1 1 0γγ α ω ω ω−= + − − + − − =  B B u r rV s a s m t t c          
This allows to obtain the optimal level of education at departure of the migrant when the 
implicit biases and risks related to agriculture are introduced: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
1
1
*
1 1 1
γ
γ α ω ω ω
− 
 =
 + − − + −   
B
u r r
c
s
a m t t
                                                     (10) 
 
The difference between the individual level of education of those who decide to migrate 
in the presence of implicit biases and risks related to agriculture, and those who migrate 
by the absence of these conditions, is represented by: 
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( )
[ ]
1
* 1
*
1
1
( )
γαω ω
ω ω ω
− − − 
= + 
− +  
u rB
u r r
m m ts
s m
                                                                                  (11) 
 
When 
(1 )ω
ω α
−
>u
r
m t
m
 , the level of education in the presence of the effects induced by the 
introduction of implicit biases is lower compared to the level of education in the absence 
of these conditions.  
 
Labor supply 
The individual labor supply corresponding to a new structure of incentives to migration is 
obtained by:  
[ ]{ }
1
1
* 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
γ
γγ
γ γα ω ω ω
γ
−
− −
 
= + − − + − 
 
u u r r
c
l a m t t   
The corresponding aggregated labor supply becomes:  
[ ]{ }
1
1
1 1( ). (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
γ
γγ
γ γα ω ω ω
γ
−
− −
 
= + + − − + − 
 
u u r u r r
c
L N mN a m t t                           (12) 
The comparison between the aggregated labor supply, when the minimum urban salary is 
guaranteed, and the initial value of the labor supply is given by: 
[ ]
* * 1(1 )
1
( )
γ
γαω ω
ω ω ω
− − − 
= = + 
− +  
u u u r
u u u r r
L l m m t
L l m
                                                                          (13) 
This aggregated labor supply, when a minimum urban salary is guaranteed, is higher than 
the initial value of the labor supply only when 
(1 )ω
ω α
−
>u
r
m t
m
 
For those who choose to stay in the rural area, the supply labor become equal to : 
[ ]
1
1
* 1
1(1 )
γ
γγ
γ γω
γ
−
− −
 
= − 
 
r r
c
l a t  
The aggregated labor supply in the rural area is: 
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( )
1
1
* 1 1(1 ) . 1
γ
γγ
γ γω
γ
−
− −
 
= − −    
 
r r r
c
L m N a t                                                                       (14)                                                                                     
The comparison between the aggregated labor supply, when a sharp decrease in salaries 
in the rural areas exists, and the initial labor supply in the same area is given by: 
* *
1(1 ) 1
γ
γ−= = − <r r
r r
L l
t
L l
                                                                                                     (15) 
 
Following Harris- Todaro model (Espindola et al, 2006), a migration flow takes place 
between the rural and the urban area where the minimum salaries exceed rural salaries 
that are declining due to the risks related to agriculture and to the biases against 
agriculture. The migrants who fail to obtain jobs in the urban formal economy where 
revenues are fixed, seek employment in the informal urban economy where salaries are 
flexible but higher than those prevailing in the rural areas. Hence, migrants would have a 
tendency to opt for the informal urban economy where they are motivated by 
revenueω such asω ω ω< ≤r u . While fixed revenue 
*ωu  is reserved to individuals 
belonging to the formal urban economy, their individual labor supply is given by *ul and 
their aggregated labor supply is uL . 
 
The labor supply is hence distributed according to the revenues of individuals in relation 
with the appropriate areas. The labor supply of the itinerant individuals between the rural 
and informal urban economy is given by < <r ul l l or < <r uL L L such as .= cL l N and 
cN is the active unemployed population after migration to the urban area.  
Proposition 3 :  
The excess of migrants as well as any person unable to access the minimum guaranteed 
salary, might engage in the informal sector. The informal sector is hence attractive for 
rural migrants.  
Urban poverty originates in part from rural migration. The latter gives birth to population 
flows that migrate towards the cities in the absence of an urban economy that is well 
prepared to receive these populations. Also, access to urban jobs in the modern sector is 
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not easy, which translates into the development of an informal sector that is often less 
demanding in terms of human and physical capital. This attracts even more rural 
migratory flows as the level of education required by the formal modern urban sector is 
not often required by the informal sector.  
The following table summarizes the different impacts of rural migration with and without 
the introduction of implicit biases and risks related to agriculture on the level of 
education, the labor force, and the development of informal urban economy.  
 
Table 1: Summary of results and comparison of situations and impacts of rural migration  
 Urban Area Rural Area 
Rural migration in the absence of implicit biases and risks related to agriculture 
Salaries ωu  ωr  
Initial labor force 
uN  rN  
Migrating labor 
force 
(probability of 
migration) 
= m rm N N  =m rN mN  
Labor force after 
migration  
= +u rN N mN  ( )1− rm N  
Optimal level of 
education at 
departure [ ]
1
1
*
( )
γ
γ ω ω ω
− 
=  
− +  u r r
c
s
a m
 
1
1
*
0
γ
γω
− 
=  
 r
c
s
a
 
Individual labor 
supply 
[ ]
1 1
1
( )
γ
γ
γ
γ ω ω ω
−
−
 
=  
− +  
u
u r r
c
l a
m
 
1
1
1
γ
γ
γ
γω
−
−  =  
 
r
r
c
l a  
Aggregated labor 
supply 
( )
[ ]
1 1
1.
( )
γ
γ
γ
γ ω ω ω
−
−
 
= +  
− +  
u u r
u r r
c
L N mN a
m
 
1
1
1(1 ) .
γ
γ
γ
γω
−
−  = −  
 
r r
r
c
L m N a  
Rural migration in the presence of implicit biases and risks related to agriculture 
Salaries * (1 )ω α ω= +u u  
* (1 )ω ω= −r rt  
Optimal level of 
education with 
implicit biases 
and risks related 
to agriculture  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
1
1
*
1 1 1
γ
γ α ω ω ω
− 
 =
 + − − + −   
B
u r r
c
s
a m t t
 
( )0
1
1
*
1
γ
γ ω
−  
=  
−    
B
r
c
s
a t
 
Individual labor 
supply under 
these conditions 
[ ]{ }
1
1
* 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
γ
γγ
γ γα ω ω ω
γ
−
− −
 
= + − − + − 
 
u u r r
c
l a m t t
 
[ ]
1
1
* 1
1(1 )
γ
γγ
γ γω
γ
−
− −
 
= − 
 
r r
c
l a t  
Aggregated labor 
supply under 
these conditions 
[ ]{ }
1
1
* 1 1( ). (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
γ
γγ
γ γα ω ω ω
γ
−
− −
 
= + + − − + − 
 
u u r u r r
c
L N mN a m t t
 
( )
1
1
* 1 1(1 ) . 1
γ
γγ
γ γω
γ
−
− −
 
= − −    
 
r r r
c
L m N a t  
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III. Preliminary Empirical Implications 
The previous models allow for observing the effects of macroeconomic distortions, 
among others, on levels of education, on rural migration, and on the increase of labor 
force in the urban side. The latter increase being difficult to observe directly in fact given 
the levels of formal urban demand for labor generates an informal side of the system that 
might possibly control the levels and mechanisms of governance in the economy. 
Accordingly, for the specific values of the parameters, different scenarios of rural 
migration were considered with different levels of distortions. The results obtained for 
the group of developing countries studied, with and without accounting for distortions, 
are summarized in tables A, B, and C in Appendix 2. Each country is considered to have 
an urban and a rural sector. Comparisons with the simulated and observed levels are 
essential to understanding the importance of the theoretical structure that explains the 
macroeconomic effects on rural migration, employment, and education. 
Description of the variables and data used:  
Urban salaries (ωu ) are obtained from the International Labor Office (Saget, 2006). Rural 
salaries (ωr ) are fixed at a proportion of 70% of urban salaries. The urban labor force 
(rural) ( ,u rN N ) was deduced based on the ratio of urban population (rural) to the total 
population multiplied by the total labor force. The data related to rural, urban, and total 
population are published by the World Bank. The total labor force appears as well in the 
World Bank database. Series of rural migration rates (m ) are used (between 0.02 and 
0.1). Similarly, different values of distortion effects on the rural side were selected 
(0 1< <t ) to conduct the simulations. In order to facilitate the estimation process, the 
remaining values were fixed as follows:  
The level of individual talent, 1=a , the unit cost of education, 1=c , the valorization 
coefficient of education level, 0.5γ = , and the coefficient related to the distortions on the 
urban side 0α = . The comparison between the theoretical results and the observed data 
requires the use of the observed average schooling years and the unemployment rate. 
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The optimal level of education and the aggregated labor supply 
 
Based on the above table of results, and comparing the different situations and effects of 
rural migration from rural to urban areas, the calculations of the optimal level of 
education, with and without distortions, in the rural and the urban sides are performed 
using the data and variables described earlier. These calculations are based in the 
theoretical results. Accordingly, the optimal level of education is found to be higher in 
the case where rural migration exists relative to its absence. In opposition to that, the 
results related to the comparisons aggregated labor supply, in the presence of biases, 
risks, and imperfections, are higher in the urban side, compared to the when implicit 
biases, imperfections and agricultural risks are absent. In rural areas, these results are 
inversed: in the case where risks and imperfections are present, the aggregated labor 
supply is lower compared to the case where these risks and imperfections are absent.  
Comparisons with real data 
In a first step, the relations between the different base variables are established: the initial 
urban salary ( uω ), the urban labor force ( uN ), the unemployment rate and the average 
schooling years. The following relations are obtained: 
 
   Table 2: Relationships between urban labor force, unemployment rate and urban wage  
Equations  R² Observations 
u u
(37.22) (2.29)
ln(N ) 15.93 0.7 ln( )ω= + ×  0.104 47 
u
(39.24) (2.78)
ln(Averageschoolingyears.) 2.56 0.13 ln( )ω= + ×  0.146 47 
 
ln(Nu)=6.22. ln(Averageschooling years) 
                    (50.4) 
0.982 47 
u
(4.27) ( 2.52)
ln(unemploymentrate) 5.4 0.21 ln(N )
−
= − ×
 
0.170 33 
 
  t-stat at 5 % significance levels are shown in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient 
 
Based on these results, the data on the employment rate are linked to the aggregated labor 
supply in the presence of biases (and even for different levels of distortions; Tables 4, 
Appendix 2). Further, the average schooling years is an inverse function of the labor 
force in the urban side and is linked as well to the optimal level of education in case of 
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migration (Appendix II). The results show that the optimal schooling and aggregated 
labor supply conditions are affected by the distortions mentioned above.    
Table 3 : Relationships between unemployment rate and the calculated urban unemployment under different 
distortions and rural migration rates 
 
 t R² Observations m 
*
u
(13.65)
ln(unemploymentrate)=0.164 ln(L )×  0.1 0.854 33 0.02 
*
u
(13.62)
ln(unemploymentrate)=0.163 ln(L )×  0.1 0.853 33 0.06 
*
u
(13.57)
ln(unemploymentrate)=0.169 ln(L )×  0.4 0.852 33 0.02 
*
u
(13.48)
ln(unemploymentrate)= 0.17 ln(L )×  0.55 0.850 33 0.06 
 
  t-stat at 5 % significance levels are shown in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient 
 
 
 
Tableau 4 : Average years of schooling and calculated supply of skilled labor under different levels of distortions 
and migration rates 
 
 t R² Observations m 
ln(Averageschoolingyears)=2.79+0.065ln(sB
*
) 
                                                     (19.47)    (2.78) 
 
0.55 0.147 47 0.04 
ln(Averageschoolingyears)=2.65+0.065ln(sB
*
) 
                                                (20.79)    (2.78) 
 
0.4 0.147 47 0.02 
ln(Averageschoolingyears)=2.78+0.065ln(sB
*
) 
                                                      (23.64)   ( 2.78) 
 
0.1 0.147 47 0.04 
ln(Averageschoolingyears)=2.72+0.065ln(sB
*
) 
                                              (22.59)    (2.78) 
 
0.25 0.147 47 0.08 
  t-stat at 5 % significance levels are shown in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient 
 
 
The above results show that the available data on unemployment rate can be used as 
instrument for unemployment rate obtained from the theoretical model. Similarly the 
average years of schooling can be used as instrument for the supply of skilled labor, 
knowing that relationship is not linear.  
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Conclusion 
 
The theoretical model used appears to be promising in explaining the likely knowledge 
losses and reduction of skills in the population remaining in locations that are sources of 
rural migration. These losses appear to be varying with countries in relation to the 
magnitude of internal rural migration. But, on the other hand skilled migrants do not 
often contribute to urban development given the limited urban demand for skills and the 
high level of competing previous urban segments of the population. These processes are 
accelerated when accounting for agricultural risks and macroeconomic distortions against 
rural areas. The preliminary empirical assessments based on developing countries with 
appropriate data, have shown promising directions for the application of the above 
theoretical models.  
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Appendix I 
 
Sensitivity of results : 
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The second derivative of human capital stock in urban area ( uL ) is given by: 
With setting 
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The sign of the above expression is given by the sign of the numerator since the 
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Appendix II 
 
 
Table A 
m = 0.02 Rural migration without biases 
Rural migration with bias and, risks  
(t = 0.25) 
Rural migration with bias and, 
risks  (t = 0.55) 
PAYS Wu Wr s* Lu Lr s*B L*u L*r s*B L*u L*r 
Albania 0.33 0.23 0.014 67707.17 97216.73 0.008 51259.89 72912.55 0.003 31523.15 43747.53 
Algeria 0.66 0.46 0.054 1253873.8 914217.16 0.031 949285.47 685662.87 0.012 583779.48 411397.72 
Argentina 0.75 0.52 0.07 3481153.2 442700.46 0.04 2635518.9 332025.34 0.015 1620757.9 199215.21 
Bangladesh 0.14 0.1 0.002 584030.97 1895241.7 0.001 442159.43 1421431.2 0 271913.57 852858.74 
Benin 0.16 0.11 0.003 53038.91 84440.11 0.002 40154.82 63330.08 0.001 24693.9 37998.05 
Botswana 0.28 0.19 0.01 29889.59 28652.59 0.006 22628.87 21489.45 0.002 13916.02 12893.67 
Brezil 0.36 0.25 0.016 7550159.3 2000707.2 0.009 5716090.9 1500530.4 0.004 3515208.8 900318.24 
Bulgaria 0.36 0.25 0.016 326529.8 147781.3 0.009 247209.88 110835.97 0.004 152025.99 66501.58 
Cameroon 0.18 0.13 0.004 161620.48 178432.7 0.002 122359.98 133824.52 0.001 75247.38 80294.71 
Chile 0.54 0.38 0.037 933059.87 163181.49 0.021 706402.98 122386.12 0.008 434414.7 73431.67 
China 0.38 0.27 0.018 32405650 63397688 0.011 24533739 47548266 0.004 15087446 28528960 
Colombia 0.68 0.48 0.058 2944401.8 1152415 0.033 2229154.1 864311.24 0.013 1370856.8 518586.74 
Croatia 0.82 0.57 0.084 324930.59 253758.19 0.048 245999.15 190318.64 0.018 151281.43 114191.19 
El Salvador 0.32 0.22 0.013 137927.94 108403.57 0.007 104422.78 81302.68 0.003 64216.59 48781.61 
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Ethiopia 0.18 0.12 0.004 250573.25 1322195.7 0.002 189704.54 991646.79 0.001 116662.08 594988.07 
Ghana 0.28 0.2 0.01 332874.74 453151.91 0.006 252013.53 339863.93 0.002 154980.07 203918.36 
Guatemala 0.37 0.26 0.017 189842.4 233525.44 0.01 143726.3 175144.08 0.004 88386.97 105086.45 
Honduras 0.09 0.07 0.001 30485.86 38680.93 0.001 23080.3 29010.69 0 14193.63 17406.42 
India 0.3 0.21 0.011 11030931 27732522 0.006 8351321.2 20799391 0.002 5135789.1 12479635 
Indonesia 0.31 0.22 0.012 3683266.4 5922586 0.007 2788535.3 4441939.5 0.003 1714857.9 2665163.7 
Jamaïca 0.27 0.19 0.009 57698.6 53182.92 0.005 43682.58 39887.19 0.002 26863.36 23932.31 
Jordan 0.39 0.28 0.019 144676.02 37617.95 0.011 109531.64 28213.46 0.004 67358.37 16928.08 
Kazakhstan 0.19 0.13 0.004 284159.05 213757.34 0.002 215131.74 160318.01 0.001 132298.98 96190.8 
Kenya 0.13 0.09 0.002 114274.39 432547.04 0.001 86515.1 324410.28 0 53203.96 194646.17 
Lebanon 0.34 0.24 0.014 118567.6 20196.14 0.008 89765.42 15147.11 0.003 55202.79 9088.26 
Madagascar 0.13 0.09 0.002 80046.69 213628.32 0.001 60601.92 160221.24 0 37268.2 96132.75 
Malawi 0.07 0.05 0.001 19422.37 105897.39 0 14704.33 79423.04 0 9042.68 47653.83 
Malaysia 0.17 0.12 0.004 301871.45 219393.1 0.002 228541.49 164544.82 0.001 140545.53 98726.89 
Mongolia 0.17 0.12 0.003 32875.99 23970.36 0.002 24889.83 17977.77 0.001 15306.43 10786.66 
Morocco 0.66 0.47 0.055 1148968 990578.52 0.032 869863.14 742933.89 0.012 534937.35 445760.33 
Mozambique 0.28 0.2 0.01 224833.94 557674.99 0.006 170217.76 418256.24 0.002 104678.35 250953.74 
Nicaragua 0.26 0.18 0.009 78946.65 61654.26 0.005 59769.1 46240.7 0.002 36756.04 27744.42 
Nigeria 0.2 0.14 0.005 1130671.1 1575587.7 0.003 856010.89 1181690.7 0.001 526418.67 709014.45 
Pakistan 0.31 0.22 0.012 1476512.1 2916695.8 0.007 1117841 2187521.9 0.003 687435.6 1312513.1 
Paraguay 0.98 0.69 0.12 381003.19 325902.12 0.069 288450.72 244426.59 0.026 177387.75 146655.95 
Peru 0.44 0.31 0.024 1120060.8 446898.06 0.014 847978.03 335173.54 0.005 521478.73 201104.13 
Philippines 0.55 0.38 0.037 3024125 2374903 0.021 2289511.1 1781177.2 0.008 1407974.4 1068706.3 
Poland 0.76 0.53 0.072 2908779.6 1744565.3 0.041 2202185.1 1308424 0.016 1354271.7 785054.39 
South Africa 0.6 0.42 0.045 2000040.6 1565684.2 0.026 1514195 1174263.2 0.01 931180.36 704557.89 
Thaïland 0.44 0.31 0.024 1594435.6 3382523.1 0.014 1207118.7 2536892.3 0.005 742338.48 1522135.4 
Turkey 1 0.7 0.125 5178885.2 2968436.7 0.071 3920841.6 2226327.5 0.027 2411189.2 1335796.5 
Uganda 0.03 0.02 0 14175.9 89717.53 0 10732.32 67288.15 0 6600.03 40372.89 
Uruguay 0.19 0.13 0.004 91238.41 9114.53 0.002 69074.97 6835.9 0.001 42478.85 4101.54 
Venezuela 0.34 0.24 0.015 977327.33 122597.54 0.008 739917.08 91948.15 0.003 455024.78 55168.89 
Vietnam 0.26 0.18 0.008 799993.46 2488863.3 0.005 605660.77 1866647.5 0.002 372461.54 1119988.5 
 
Table B 
m = 0.06 Rural migration without biases 
Rural migration with bias and, 
risks  (t = 0.1) 
Rural migration with bias and, 
risks  (t = 0.4) 
PAYS Wu Wr s* Lu Lr s*B L*u L*r s*B L*u L*r 
Albania 0.33 0.23 0.01 72928.06 93248.7 0.01 66244.68 83923.83 0.01 46194.54 55949.22 
Algeria 0.66 0.46 0.06 1313460.6 876902.17 0.05 1193090.5 789211.96 0.02 831980.34 526141.3 
Argentina 0.75 0.52 0.07 3558857 424631.05 0.06 3232711 382167.95 0.03 2254273.2 254778.63 
Bangladesh 0.14 0.1 0 673303.82 1817884.9 0 611599.94 1636096.4 0 426488.27 1090730.9 
Benin 0.16 0.11 0 57475.59 80993.57 0 52208.32 72894.22 0 36406.54 48596.14 
Botswana 0.28 0.19 0.01 31597.19 27483.1 0.01 28701.52 24734.79 0 20014.49 16489.86 
Brezil 0.36 0.25 0.02 7762252.1 1919045.7 0.01 7050892.5 1727141.1 0.01 4916813.7 1151427.4 
Bulgaria 0.36 0.25 0.02 338266.88 141749.41 0.01 307266.93 127574.47 0.01 214267.1 85049.64 
Cameroon 0.18 0.13 0 171837.81 171149.73 0 156090 154034.76 0 108846.57 102689.84 
Chile 0.54 0.38 0.04 955750.99 156521.02 0.03 868162.67 140868.92 0.02 605397.7 93912.61 
China 0.38 0.27 0.02 35610655 60810027 0.02 32347171 54729024 0.01 22556721 36486016 
Colombia 0.68 0.48 0.06 3042695.2 1105377.6 0.05 2763852.1 994839.88 0.02 1927322.8 663226.58 
Croatia 0.82 0.57 0.09 341077.31 243400.71 0.07 309819.8 219060.64 0.03 216047.3 146040.43 
El Salvador 0.32 0.22 0.01 144810.73 103978.94 0.01 131539.78 93581.04 0.01 91726.91 62387.36 
Ethiopia 0.18 0.12 0 310187.19 1268228.6 0 281760.56 1141405.7 0 196480.69 760937.13 
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Ghana 0.28 0.2 0.01 357504.28 434655.91 0.01 324741.35 391190.32 0 226452.57 260793.55 
Guatemala 0.37 0.26 0.02 202845.94 223993.79 0.01 184256.43 201594.41 0.01 128487.93 134396.28 
Honduras 0.09 0.07 0 32623.45 37102.11 0 29633.72 33391.9 0 20664.55 22261.27 
India 0.3 0.21 0.01 12379473 26600582 0.01 11244975 23940524 0 7841482 15960349 
Indonesia 0.31 0.22 0.01 3993825.9 5680847.7 0.01 3627817.9 5112763 0.01 2529793.9 3408508.7 
Jamaïca 0.27 0.19 0.01 60905.86 51012.19 0.01 55324.24 45910.97 0 38579.37 30607.31 
Jordan 0.39 0.28 0.02 148710.02 36082.52 0.02 135081.72 32474.27 0.01 94196.82 21649.51 
Kazakhstan 0.19 0.13 0 297938.09 205032.55 0 270634.01 184529.3 0 188721.79 123019.53 
Kenya 0.13 0.09 0 134325.7 414892.06 0 122015.63 373402.85 0 85085.41 248935.23 
Lebanon 0.34 0.24 0.01 121428.45 19371.81 0.01 110300.32 17434.63 0.01 76915.96 11623.09 
Madagascar 0.13 0.09 0 90350.99 204908.8 0 82070.92 184417.92 0 57230.69 122945.28 
Malawi 0.07 0.05 0 24185.98 101575.05 0 21969.49 91417.55 0 15320.03 60945.03 
Malaysia 0.17 0.12 0 316187.49 210438.28 0 287210.98 189394.45 0 200281.44 126262.97 
Mongolia 0.17 0.12 0 34438.33 22991.98 0 31282.28 20692.78 0 21814.14 13795.19 
Morocco 0.66 0.47 0.06 1209968.6 950146.74 0.05 1099082.9 855132.07 0.02 766425.8 570088.04 
Mozambique 0.28 0.2 0.01 252003.04 534912.74 0.01 228908.61 481421.47 0 159625.32 320947.65 
Nicaragua 0.26 0.18 0.01 82869.73 59137.76 0.01 75275.26 53223.99 0 52491.86 35482.66 
Nigeria 0.2 0.14 0.01 1215852.7 1511278 0 1104427.7 1360150.2 0 770152.91 906766.78 
Pakistan 0.31 0.22 0.01 1623718.7 2797647 0.01 1474915.5 2517882.3 0 1028505.9 1678588.2 
Paraguay 0.98 0.69 0.12 401123.35 312599.99 0.1 364363.02 281340 0.05 254082.03 187560 
Peru 0.44 0.31 0.02 1157808.4 428657.32 0.02 1051702.9 385791.59 0.01 733386.18 257194.39 
Philippines 0.55 0.38 0.04 3174954 2277968.2 0.03 2883990.3 2050171.3 0.02 2011099 1366780.9 
Poland 0.76 0.53 0.07 3031258.4 1673358.6 0.06 2753463.4 1506022.7 0.03 1920078.4 1004015.1 
South Africa 0.6 0.42 0.05 2099584.4 1501778.7 0.04 1907171.2 1351600.9 0.02 1329931.7 901067.24 
Thaïland 0.44 0.31 0.02 1763148.8 3244460.9 0.02 1601567.7 2920014.8 0.01 1116824.6 1946676.5 
Turkey 1 0.7 0.13 5391187.9 2847276 0.11 4897120.8 2562548.4 0.05 3414919.6 1708365.6 
Uganda 0.03 0.02 0 18172.95 86055.59 0 16507.52 77450.03 0 11511.23 51633.36 
Uruguay 0.19 0.13 0 93170.79 8742.51 0 84632.3 7868.26 0 59016.82 5245.51 
Venezuela 0.34 0.24 0.02 999071.79 117593.56 0.01 907513.4 105834.2 0.01 632838.23 70556.14 
Vietnam 0.26 0.18 0.01 917789.55 2387277.1 0.01 833680.15 2148549.4 0 581351.94 1432366.3 
 
 
 
Table C 
m = 0.1 Rural Migration without  bias  
Rural Migration with implicit bias 
and risks        (t = 0.25) 
Rural Migration with implicit bias  
and  risks (t = 0.7) 
PAYS Wu Wr s* Lu Lr s*B L*u L*r s*B L*u L*r 
Albania 0.33 0.23 0.01 78285 89280.67 0.01 61394.75 66960.5 0 30992.28 26784.2 
Algeria 0.66 0.46 0.06 1374326.8 839587.19 0.04 1077811.1 629690.39 0.01 544082.8 251876.16 
Argentina 0.75 0.52 0.07 3637180.3 406561.65 0.05 2852446.2 304921.23 0.01 1439924.8 121968.49 
Bangladesh 0.14 0.1 0 765228.91 1740528 0 600128.15 1305396 0 302946.79 522158.41 
Benin 0.16 0.11 0 62030.42 77547.04 0 48647.15 58160.28 0 24557.25 23264.11 
Botswana 0.28 0.19 0.01 33344.89 26313.61 0.01 26150.62 19735.21 0 13200.92 7894.08 
Brezil 0.36 0.25 0.02 7977144.6 1837384.2 0.01 6256048.3 1378038.1 0 3158075 551215.25 
Bulgaria 0.36 0.25 0.02 350210.76 135717.52 0.01 274651.59 101788.14 0 138645.08 40715.26 
Cameroon 0.18 0.13 0 182304.85 163866.76 0 142971.95 122900.07 0 72172.74 49160.03 
Chile 0.54 0.38 0.04 978670.46 149860.55 0.02 767518.96 112395.41 0.01 387446.25 44958.17 
China 0.38 0.27 0.02 38904379 58222366 0.01 30510626 43666775 0 15401871 17466710 
Colombia 0.68 0.48 0.06 3142601.3 1058340.3 0.04 2464574.3 793755.22 0.01 1244125.7 317502.09 
Croatia 0.82 0.57 0.09 357579.13 233043.24 0.05 280430.21 174782.43 0.01 141562.15 69912.97 
Dominican Republic 0.39 0.27 0.02 270831.97 153520.32 0.01 212399.04 115140.24 0 107219.78 46056.1 
 24 
El Salvador 0.32 0.22 0.01 151845.23 99554.3 0.01 119084.1 74665.73 0 60114.07 29866.29 
Ethiopia 0.18 0.12 0 371651.42 1214261.4 0 291466.36 910696.03 0 147133.24 364278.41 
Ghana 0.28 0.2 0.01 382767.96 416159.92 0.01 300184.46 312119.94 0 151534.17 124847.98 
Guatemala 0.37 0.26 0.02 216176.27 214462.14 0.01 169535.5 160846.61 0 85582.11 64338.64 
Honduras 0.09 0.07 0 34815.16 35523.3 0 27303.67 26642.47 0 13782.99 10656.99 
India 0.3 0.21 0.01 13766823 25468642 0.01 10796584 19101482 0 5450153.3 7640592.7 
Indonesia 0.31 0.22 0.01 4312673.4 5439109.5 0.01 3382199.4 4079332.2 0 1707346.1 1631732.9 
Jamaïca 0.27 0.19 0.01 64187.55 48841.46 0.01 50338.86 36631.09 0 25411.23 14652.44 
Jordan 0.39 0.28 0.02 152796.65 34547.1 0.01 119830.25 25910.32 0 60490.73 10364.13 
Kazakhstan 0.19 0.13 0 312016.26 196307.76 0 244697.69 147230.82 0 123524.25 58892.33 
Kenya 0.13 0.09 0 154982.32 397237.08 0 121544.35 297927.81 0 61356.01 119171.12 
Lebanon 0.34 0.24 0.02 124317.55 18547.48 0.01 97495.61 13910.61 0 49216.13 5564.24 
Madagascar 0.13 0.09 0 100954.26 196189.28 0 79173.03 147141.96 0 39966.82 58856.78 
Malawi 0.07 0.05 0 29097.79 97252.71 0 22819.84 72939.53 0 11519.53 29175.81 
Malaysia 0.17 0.12 0 330810.56 201483.46 0 259437.05 151112.59 0 130964.73 60445.04 
Mongolia 0.17 0.12 0 36034.21 22013.59 0 28259.71 16510.2 0 14265.6 6604.08 
Morocco 0.66 0.47 0.06 1272355.5 909714.96 0.04 997840.44 682286.22 0.01 503713.34 272914.49 
Mozambique 0.28 0.2 0.01 279952.56 512150.5 0.01 219551.83 384112.87 0 110830.53 153645.15 
Namibia 0.24 0.17 0.01 17377.56 28025 0 13628.3 21018.75 0 6879.61 8407.5 
Nicaragua 0.26 0.18 0.01 86879.09 56621.26 0.01 68134.63 42465.95 0 34394.6 16986.38 
Nigeria 0.2 0.14 0.01 1303239.1 1446968.3 0 1022060.8 1085226.2 0 515939.88 434090.48 
Pakistan 0.31 0.22 0.01 1775007 2678598.2 0.01 1392043.1 2008948.7 0 702708.24 803579.46 
Paraguay 0.98 0.69 0.13 421699.58 299297.87 0.08 330716.45 224473.4 0.02 166946.82 89789.36 
Peru 0.44 0.31 0.03 1196181.5 410416.58 0.02 938101.23 307812.44 0 473556.78 123124.98 
Philippines 0.55 0.38 0.04 3329106.5 2181033.3 0.02 2610840.4 1635775 0.01 1317961.3 654310 
Poland 0.76 0.53 0.08 3156178.5 1602151.8 0.05 2475222.2 1201613.9 0.01 1249500.8 480645.55 
South Africa 0.6 0.42 0.05 2201319.2 1437873.3 0.03 1726377 1078404.9 0.01 871481.16 431361.98 
Thaïland 0.44 0.31 0.03 1936595.6 3106398.7 0.02 1518768.4 2329799.1 0 766679.61 931919.62 
Turkey 1 0.7 0.13 5607644.6 2726115.4 0.08 4397776 2044586.5 0.02 2220012.7 817834.6 
Uganda 0.03 0.02 0 22295.56 82393.65 0 17485.22 61795.24 0 8826.6 24718.1 
Uruguay 0.19 0.13 0 95115.93 8370.49 0 74594.34 6277.87 0 37655.49 2511.15 
Venezuela 0.34 0.24 0.02 1020987.8 112589.58 0.01 800706.19 84442.18 0 404199.28 33776.87 
Vietnam 0.26 0.18 0.01 1039068.6 2285690.8 0.01 814886 1714268.1 0 411357.3 685707.25 
 
 
 
 
